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The Inviolability of Privacy Belonging
To a Citizen's Political Loyalties *
Democracy is that bourne from which no reform party returns--as
yet.
Henry Demarest Lloyd**

By MARK D. ROSENBAUM***
The following article is an edited version of a brief submitted by
the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of three campaign organizations affiliated with the Socialist Workers' Party of California. Socialist Workers Etc. v. Brown, 53 Cal. App. 3d 879, - Cal. Rptr. (Dec. 19, 1975). Currently on appeal before the Supreme Court of
California,this case seeks to test the constitutionality of the "campaign
disclosure" requirements of the California Political Reform Act of
1974, insofar as they discriminateagainst third parties and their candidates.
Despite the United States Supreme Court decision Buckley v.
Valeo, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976) which upheld in part
the constitutionalityof the FederalElection CampaignAct of 1974, including its disclosure provisions, the editors believe the issues presented herein have not been rendered moot for several reasons. First,
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley insists upon a narrow reading
of the disclosure provisions so that a showing of "substantialharrassment" will waive the disclosure requirements of the act. Id. at
4149. Secondly, the SWP challenge is to the disclosure requirements
of a California statute, and therefore the pertinent provisions of the
* Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
** The Populists at St. Louis, REVIEw OF REviEws 278 (Sept. 1896). Reprinted
in G. TiINALL, THE POPuLIST READER 212 (1966).

*** Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, Los Angeles, California.
The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Patricia Stem Green
in preparing this article.
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Constitution of the State of California must be interpreted and applied
by the court in framing its decision. Indeed, Justice Mosk said in Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3rd 652, 532 P.2d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468 (1975), the California Constitution contains, "A protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment." Id. at
658. And finally, Buckley notwithstanding, the SWP is entitled to its
day in court.
Introduction
The public outcries which accompanied the revelations of corruption in government left lawmakers with no choice but to spearhead the
enactment of so-called political reform legislation. With the eager
support of well meaning citizens a spate of new laws was passed to
check political campaign abuses. Yet when the clamor had abated, and
when the purported reforms had been scrutinized, it became evident that
the fundamental changes demanded were nowhere in sight. The very
interests which had produced Watergate remained strong. For high
public and corporate officials, the threat of genuine sanctions for unlawful activities was as illusory as ever. Control over the political process
remained in the hands of the rich and the powerful.
At the same time, concern for the plight of minor parties and
candidates, academic at best, was notably absent from the new legislation. Although it was disclosed that groups espousing dissident views
and opposing the policies and practices of the major parties and their
principal supporters had been subjected to vicious harassment by the
government and private citizens, apparently there was no political
capital to be gained from a public display of sensitivity to the plight of
maverick factions in the community. Worse, the new statutes only
increased the likelihood of future persecution. By requiring even the
least influential adherents of unpopular parties to make public their
names and addresses, ready-made enemies lists became available to
anyone seeking them.
Thus, to protect the integrity and viability of political groups of the
genre of the Socialist Workers Party, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) determined that political reform legislation had to be challenged on First Amendment grounds-the rights of associational privacy and anonymity.
Background of the Litigation
The campaign committees in this consolidated action support and
endorse candidates and policies of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).
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Historically, such activities have resulted in supporters, adherents, and
financial contributors being subjected to official and private acts of
harassment and reprisal once their identities were made known. Association with the SWP, even by individuals performing paid services
without sharing the party's political views, has also spawned intimida-

tion. Of necessity then, in order to participate within the political
process, the SWP and its supporting organizations have been forced to
rely upon anonymous contributions and to pledge faithfully -that the
identities of those proffering assistance and services would not be divulged.
The California Political Reform Act of 19741 effectively prohibits

anonymous contributions to campaign funds of sums of fifty dollars or
more by requiring public disclosure of the names and addresses of such

contributors by the committees in receipt of the financial assistance.'
1. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 81000-91014 (West Supp. 1975).
2. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 84210(g), (h) (West Supp. 1975) requires inter alia that
the mandatory campaign statements must divulge: "(g) The full name of each person
from whom a contribution or contributions totaling fifty dollars ($50) or more has been
received, together with his street address, occupation, and the name of his employer, if
any, or the principal place of business if he is self-employed, the amount he contributed, the date on which each contribution was received during the period covered by
the campaign statement, and the cumulative amount he contributed." In the case of
committees which are listed as contributors, the campaign statement shall also contain
the number assigned to the committee by the Secretary of State or if no such number
has been assigned, the full name and street address of the treasurer of the committee.
Loans received shall be set forth in a separate schedule and the foregoing information
shall be stated in regard to the lender and any person who is liable directly, indirectly
or contingently on the loan, together with the date and amount of the loan and, if the
loan has been repaid, the date of repayment and by whom paid. (h) The full name
and street address of each person to whom an expenditure or expenditures totaling fifty
dollars ($50) or more has been made, together with the amount of each separate expenditure to each person during the period covered by the campaign statement; a brief
description of the consideration for which the expenditure was made; the full name and
street address of the person providing the consideration for which any expenditure was
made if different from the payee: and in the case of the committees which are listed,
the number assigned to each such committee by the Secretary of State or if no such
number has been assigned, the full name and street address of the treasurer of the committee."
Sections 84301, 84302, and 84304 of Chapter 4 of Article 3 provide:
§ 84301. "No contribution shall be made, directly or indirectly, by any person in
a name other than the name by which such person is identified for legal purposes."
§ 84302. "No person shall make a contribution on behalf of another, or while acting as the intermediary or agent of another, without disclosing to the recipient of the
contribution both his own full name and street address, occupation, and the name of
his employer, if any, or his principal place of business if he is self-employed, and the
full name and street address, occupation, and the name of employer, if any, or principal
place of business if self-employed, of the other person. The recipient of the contribution
shall include in his campaign statement the full name and street address, occupation, and
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The act also effectively prohibits the anonymous provisions of services to

political candidates or committees by requiring the public disclosure of
the name and address of each individual to whom expenditures of fifty

dollars or more have been made, in addition to the purpose for each
expenditure. 3 In like manner, the Waxman-Dymally Act 4 proscribes

anonymous contributions and expenditures for services of one hundred
dollars or more. 5
the name of the employer, if any, or the principal place of business if self-employed,
of both the intermediary and the contributor."
§ 84304. "No person shall make an anonymous contribution or contributions to
a candidate, committee or any other person totaling fifty dollars ($50) or more in a
calendar year. An anonymous contribution of fifty dollars ($50) or more shall not be
kept by the intended recipient but instead shall be promptly paid to the Secretary of
State for deposit in the General Fund of the state."
Finally, Section 81008 states that: "Every report and statement filed pursuant to
this title is a public record open for public inspection ..
3. POLrICAL REFORM Aar OF 1974
§ 84303. "No expenditure shall be made, other than overhead or normal operating expenses, by an agent or independent contractor, including but not limited to an advertising agency, on behalf of or for the benefit of any candidate or committee unless
it is reported by the candidate or committee as if the expenditure were made directly
by the candidate or committee, unless the agent or independent contractor files a campaign statement reporting the expenditure. The agent or independent contractor shall
make known to the candidate or committee all information required to be reported by
this section.
4. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11500-11614 (West Supp. 1975).
5. Relevant provisions of the WAXMAN-DYMALLY AcT mirror their counterparts
in the PoLrCAL REFORm ACT OF 1974 in most respects:
§ 11518(e). "The full name and city, state, occupation, and the name of his or
her employer, if any, or the principal place of business if he or she is self-employed,
of each person from whom a contribution or contributions totaling one hundred dollars
($100) or more has been received, together with the amount contributed by each such
person and the cumulative amount contributed by each such person, provided, that in
the case of committees which are listed as contributors, the campaign statement shall
also contain the number assigned to the committee by the Secretary of State or if no
such number has been assigned, the full name and street address of the treasurer of the
committee."
§ 11518(f). "The full name and city, state, of each person to whom an expenditure
or expenditures totaling one hundred dollars ($100) or more has been made, together
with the amount of each separate expenditure to each such person during the period covered by the campaign statement and the cumulative amount paid to each such person;
a brief description of the purpose for which the expenditure was made; the full name
and city and state of the person providing the consideration for which any expenditure
was made if different from the payee; and in the case of committees which are listed,
the number assigned to each such committee by the Secretary of State or if no such
number has been assigned, the full name and city, and state of the treasurer of the committee."
§ 11562. Contributionsmade by agents
"Any person who makes a contribution on behalf of another, or while acting as the intermediary or agent of another, shall disclose to the recipient of such contribution both
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It is the Socialist Workers Party's position that the sections of the
Political Reform Act and the Waxman-Dymally Act requiring public
disclosure of contributors and suppliers of services seriously violate their

constitutional rights of associational privacy and anonymity, placing into
jeopardy the party's existence as a viable political force within our
democratic system.

The Socialist Workers Party is not a newcomer to American elections. It has participated in electoral politics since its founding in 1938

and has nominated candidates for public office at all levels since 1948.
In 1972 the SWP presidential candidate, Linda Jenness, received more

than 96,000 votes. In that year Ms. Jenness appeared on the ballots of
twenty-three states. A year later thirty-two candidates supported by
the Socialist Workers Party ran in California statewide elections with
varying degrees of success, and in the 1974 California general election

the Socialist Workers Party endorsed a slate of sixteen candidates.
Parallel to active participation in the nation's electoral system the

Socialist Workers Party and its supporting campaign committees are
involved in educating the electorate to novel and creative modes of
approaching important political issues. Indeed, though their campaigns
are waged quite seriously, the SWP membership harbors no illusions as
to the present possibilities of electing a large number of their candi-

dates." Thus elections become an important forum for the SWP to
his or her own full name and city, state, occupation, and the name of his or her employer, if any, or the principal place of business if he or she is self-employed, and the
full name of his or her employer, if any, or the principal place of business if he or she
is self-employed, of such other person. The recipient of such a contribution shall include in his or her campaign statement the full name and city, state, occupation, and
the name of his or her employer, if any, or the principal place of business if he or she
is self-employed, of both the intermediary and contributor."
§ 11563. Anonymous contributions
"No person shall make an anonymous contribution or contributions to a candidate, committee, or any other person in a calendar year totaling one hundred dollars ($100) or
more. An anonymous contribution of one hundred dollars ($100) or more shall not
be used by the intended recipient but shall be promptly paid to the State Treasurer to
be deposited in the General Fund of the state."
§ 11564. Expenditures made by agents
"Any expenditure, other than overhead or normal operating expenses, made by an agent
or independent contractor, including but not limited to an advertising agency, on behalf
of or for the benefit of any candidate or committee, shall be reported by the candidate
or committee as if the expenditure were made directly by the candidate or committee,
unless the agent or independent contractor files a campaign statement reporting the expenditure. The agent or independent contractor shall disclose to the candidate or committee all information required to be reported by this section."
6. Illustrative of this point are the burdensome requirements in California which
keep numerous SWP candidates off the statewide ballot, though these candidates still

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

(Vol. 3

peacefully disseminate its views regarding significant foreign, national
and local affairs.
It is noteworthy that many of these views, initially labeled as
radical or revolutionary, have since become established as bedrock
elements of the platforms of many candidates of both major political
parties. Public calls for equality for blacks and women, for diplomatic
recognition of communist nations, and for governmental assistance to
the aged and the poor followed intensive, lengthy campaigns by the
SWP on behalf of the same issues.
The SWP heritage of vigorous participation in general elections in
order to elect candidates and to fuel the political marketplace of ideas
continues today. The SWP campaign committees have organized primarily to support its nominees for election to federal, state, and local
offices throughout California. In last April's Los Angeles primary, for
instance, the SWP endorsed four candidates for the board of election,
two for the board of trustees of the community college district, and two
for the Los Angeles city council.
All of these candidates ran on the Socialist Workers Party platform, which seeks to replace capitalism in the United States with socialism. More specifically, the SWP program promotes certain political,
social and economic goals. 7 Yet, in spite of the fact that all their
activities are openly directed toward the mainstream of American pollwage vigorous campaigns. The name of their 1974 gubernatorial candidate, Olga Rodriguez, for example, was not permitted to appear on the November, 1974 ballot.
7. "1. End U.S. Role as World Cop;
2. Fight High Prices;
3. Provide Jobs for all;

4. The Unconditional Right to Strike;
5. Expose the Energy Crisis;

6. End Racist Oppression;
7. End the Oppression of Women;
8. No Cutbacks in Education;
9. Improved Health Care, Housing and Mass Transportation;
10. Tax the Rich, Not the Workers;
11. Defend and Extend Democratic Rights;
12. Civil and Human Rights for Prisoners;
13. Civil and Human Rights for Gay People;
14. Halt Destruction of the Environment; and
15. Establishment of a Labor Party."
The Socialist Alternative for California, Nov. 1974 [hereinafter cited as The Socialist
Alternative for California]. This pamphlet was issued as part of the November, 1974

electoral effort.
SWP committees are presently engaged in preparing a new platform for impending elections. This activity, however, had to be shelved temporarily despite its obvious
importance because of the recent bombing of SWP Campaign Headquarters.
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tics, individuals and their families associated and identified with the
Socialist Workers Party in any respect, whether candidates, contributors, workers, members, supporters, or sympathizers, have been subjected to a systematic pattern of official and unofficial governmental
and private harassment, surveillance, violence, interrogations, discrimination, deprivation of employment, and general denial of rights.
Indeed, -the SWP would candidly confess that the most difficult
hurdle which it must clear in lawsuits of this sort is to convince courts
that the sworn declarations and affidavits of its members are in fact
true. Mere written descriptions of the multitude of acts of intimidation and reprisal scarcely convey the terror and devastation visited on
the personal and political lives of the nonprofessional SWP supporters
and adherents, and persons furnishing needed services. The SWP
committees genuinely fear that Watergate and its progeny have perhaps
made credible claims of private and official exploits of sabotage and
disruption, undertaken solely because of fear of the consequences of
alien ideas. At the least, the profusion of reports of such activities may
well have numbed public sensibilities to the horror which victims of
such endeavors have experienced and continue to experience.
For example, based upon the recent revelation of official government documents it is now plain that as early as 1961 the F.B.I. had
formulated and begun the implementation of a sweeping project designed to subdue and ultimately put an end to the SWP. As part of its
"Counter-Intelligence Program" (COINTELPRO) a specific proposal
entitled "SWP Disruption Program" was instituted. In a directive dated
October 12, 1961 from then F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover, the
F.B.I. declared:
The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has, over the past several
years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis
through running candidates for public office and strongly directing
and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration
problems arising in the South. . . . The youth group of the SWP
has also been operating on this basis in connection with SWP policies.
.Offices receiving copies of this letter are participating in the
Bureau's Communist Party, USA, CounterintelligenceProgram. ,It
is felt that a disruption program along similar lines could be initiated against the SWP on a very selective basis. ...
It is pointed out, however, that this program is not intended
to be a "crash" program. Only carefully thought-out operations
with the widest possible effect and benefit to the nation should be
submitted. It may be desirable to expand the program after the
effects have been evaluated [censored].
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Each office is, therefore, requested to carefully evaluate such
a program and submit their [sic] views to the Bureau regarding
initiating a SWP disruption program on a limited basis. 8

Without complete access to F.B.I. files it is impossible to discern the
full extent to which the SWP Disruption Program was actually carried
out. But there is no question that COINTELPRO was activated by the
F.B.I. against SWP committees. 9 As recently as October 9, 1969,
virtually eight years after the inception of the program, internal memoranda were being circulated throughout -theF.B.I. in order to determine

the most efficient manner by which the program could be maintained,
albeit under a different label."0

Examination of these memoranda reveals that the electoral activities of the Socialist Workers Party, protected under the Constitution,
have been viewed by the government as the triggering mechanism for
intensified harassment, surveillance and other "counter-intelligence"
operations directed against the SWP. Once their identities were publicly
disclosed, SWP members became focal objects of governmental atten-

tion. It is important to note that as early as 1962 it had been judicially
determined that there existed:
[n]o substantial evidence in the record that the Socialist Workers
Party advocates or teaches by its "Declaration of Principles and
Constitution" the violent or forceful overthrow of the government
of the United States within the meaning of the test laid down by
Scales and Noto. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence
showing that there is a party line within the organization which advocates or teaches such overthrow.'"
8. Record at 176, Socialist Workers 1974 California Campaign Comm. v. Brown,
No. 45943 (Cal. 2d App. Dis., filed July 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as SWP v. Brown];
Record at 162, Central-East Los Angeles Socialist Workers Party v. Pines, No. 46258
(Cal. 2d App. Dis., filed July 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as C-E Los Angeles SWP
Workers v. Pines].
9. The N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 4, discussed recent relevations
of the F.B.I. release of 3138 pages of internal documents showing that the F.B.I. had conducted "detailed investigations of virtually every officer or official the 2500 member
party ever had" plus, in 573 pages, revealed "startling" disruption activities including attempts to remove a Boy Scoutmaster due to his wife's SWP activities.
10. Record at 177, SWP v. Brown;'Record at 163, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines.
11. Scythes v. Webb, 307 F.2d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 1962). See also Gordon v.
Blount, 336 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1971). The Evenhuis incident referred to within the
Gordon opinion concerned Kenneth Ward Evenhuis, a resident of Los Angeles, who had
been denied governmental employment because of his truthful assertion that the SWP
did not advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force. This
case is of particular relevance because it demonstrates how the government utilizes financial contribution to the SWP as one of its key indices of support leading to harassment and eventual discharge from employment. Central to the government's attack on
Evenhuis were the following charges: (w) "On April 23, 1968, at an SWP meeting,
you pledged $50 to the Spring SWP National Fund Drive of which amount you paid
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Although the SWP has historically operated in the mainstream of
American politics to espouse its admittedly dissident viewpoints, it
continues to be victimized by COINTELPRO and its progeny. The

F.B.I. itself has admitted 2,370 separate "operations" as part of its
COINTELPRO exercises. 1 2 Assuming solely for the sake of argument

the veracity of the number of operations acknowledged, it is apparent
that many SWP followers will never know the true reasons for their loss
of jobs or housing or the chaos inflicted on their lives as the result of

their public support of protected SWP policies. Nor will they receive
due compensation. Simple people must continue to bear the effects of
open participation within the political process, or not participate at all.
Lately revealed government admissions concerning Dr. Morris
Starsky, only disclosed under the compulsion of a lengthy Freedom of
Information Act lawsuit, 13 are one manifestation of the results of
public disclosure of alliance with the SWP. Dr. Starsky's account of his
ordeal demonstrates the extraordinarily pervasive injuries he sustained
14
from disclosure of this alliance.
$20." (j) "At the SWP Executive Committee held on September 20, 1965, it was announced that you and your wife had donated $100 to the SWP, and that this money
you and your wife had received as a wedding gift." See Record at 178-210, SWP v.
Brown, supra note 8; Record at 164-92 C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note
8.
12. NEwswEnn, Feb. 17, 1975, at 21.
13. Record at 139-43, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8.
14. Dr. Starsky, a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, states in his affidavit:
"From 1964 to 1970 I was an assistant professor of philosophy at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona. My record as a professional philosopher and as a teacher of
philosophy has always been considered outstanding by my colleagues and my administrative superiors ....
"On election day of 1968 my name appeared on the ballot in Arizona as an elector
pledged to the candidates of the Socialist Workers Party. Subsequently I became widely
known in Arizona as a spokesman for the campaign platform and general political views
of the Socialist Workers Party.
"In the summer of 1969 I heard for the first time that my position had been in
jeopardy during that year; Douglas Warner, and the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts,
George Peek, informed me that the Regents were pressuring the University to force me
out of my position.
"By February of 1970, the Arizona state legislature went so far as to warn the Regents publicly that there would be no university appropriation if I weren't fired. An
ad hoc faculty committee was appointed to investigate my conduct; it concluded that
there were no grounds to fire me. Under pressure from the Regents, the President of
the University nevertheless brought charges against me.
"While preparing to take legal action against the Regents, I began to look for another job.
"The Philosophy Department of Dennison University in Ohio was prepared to offer me a position, but the university administration there refused to hire me because of
the events in Arizona.
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After learning of the F.B.I.'s role in persecuting him, Dr. Starsky
said:
I did not know and only recently found out, when I obtained FBI
documents from my file through the Freedom of Information Act,
"In August I obtained a position for one year as a lecturer in Philosophy at San
Diego State College of California. There was an informal understanding that if funds
became available for a permanent position I would be given first consideration. On December 1, 1970, a vicious editorial was published in the San Diego Union demanding
that the College get rid of me. At this point the administration became quite disturbed
about my presence on campus. The Vice-President for Academic Affairs informed me
that Chancellor Dumke had called and expressed his concern about how it happened
that a "card carrying communist" had been hired at San Diego State College. The administration had already received a file on me from somewhere and I caught a glimpse
of some of the material in it when it was made available to the Chair of Philosophy
Department. What I saw were clippings from the Militant newspaper about my Arizona
case.
"It was quite clear early in December, 1970, that the Philosophy department would
not be permitted to re-hire me for the next year. In fact, I received a letter from the
Dean informing me that there were no funds available to re-hire me for the following
year before the end of December. This is the earliest date that anyone has ever been
formally notified of his termination based on lack of funds in the history of the school.
"In July, 1971, I received a phone call from the Dean at Cal State Dominguez Hills
in Gardena, California. I was informed that they had received three letters recommending me for the position of Chair of the Department of Philosophy from highly respected
philosophers around the country. I was invited to the campus for an interview and I
accepted the invitation.
"In August, 1971, I received an offer from Cal State Dominguez Hills and I accepted it immediately, I moved to Los Angeles, rented an apartment, obtained a key to
the Philosophy department offices, completed the employment procedures and prepared
a text book order for the upcoming semester.
"Nine days before the beginning of classes I received a letter from President Cain
of Cal State Dominguez Hills stating that he had been informed of my termination of
employment at Arizona State University and informing me that I would not be appointed to the faculty at Cal State Dominguez Hills.
"Once again I was forced to go to court to defend my rights. In addition I was
now forced to seek non-teaching employment since there are usually no vacancies in
philosophy once the school year begins.
"I had great difficulty finding a job. ...
"I finally found a job in January of 1972 as a coding clerk for a marketing research
firm. My starting salary was $2.75 and when I was laid off one year later my salary
had climbed to $5.25 an hour.
"On December 27, 1972, the Federal District Court in Arizona ordered the Regents
to reinstate me to the faculty at Arizona State University. An account of this decision
and the related California suit was carried in the Los Angeles Times.
"While working at the marketing research firm I sought academic employment continuously without success. I could find no work of any kind from January, 1973, until
late May, when I found a temporary coding clerk position at another marketing research
firm. This position lasted until July and I was once again without employment until
September when I found a job as a parking lot attendant. All of this time I was actively
seeking academic employment in which I could utilize my training.
"The Regents appealed the reinstatement order to the Ninth Circuit and it is still
pending. It is on the Court's calendar for October, 1974. The Dominguez Hills case
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that the appearance of my name as an elector for the SWP caused
me to be targeted for COINTELPRO (counterintelligence) activities. Although the documents do not reveal all the things that the
FBI did, as the documents put it, to discredit me, they do reveal
that the local FBI-with approval from Washington-sent an
anonymous letter falsely accusing me of improper conduct to every
member of a faculty committee which was at the time hearing official university charges against me.' 5
The precise combination of governmental and private efforts directed at Dr. Starsky will probably never be known. Still, the conclusions of The New York Times cannot be gainsaid:
Former Attorney General Saxbe has released evidence that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation engaged in a deliberate campaign
of defamation against a radical professor at Arizona State University. The clandestine efforts, which included the writing of anonymous letters to a faculty committee dealing with the teacher's professional future, continued for a period of two years, between 1968
and 1970. They appear to have had the personal approval of the
late F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover.
Dr. Morris Starsky, philosophy professor, anti-war activist and
member of the Socialist Workers Party, who was the target of these
attacks, was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona State Board of
Regents, against the faculty committee's recommendations. Denials
by a spokesman for the Regents of any link between the poisonpen letters and the firing are irrelevant to any appraisal of the
F.B.I. action. What matters is that the bureau appears to have
engaged in an illegal and despicable act of faceless persecution and
slander.
Even as a single aberration, the acts .against 'Professor Starsky
would be intolerable. But beyond one professor's right to justice
lurks the question of how many more dissident faculty members
may have been similar targets. Dr. Starsky was, by all accounts,
hardly a figure of great personal influence or national visibility. If
the F.B.I. found it necessary to take "counter-intelligence" action
against him, it is reasonable to suspect that his case may not have
been unique. As Congress investigates the abuses of domestic intelligence, it has a special responsibility to seek full disclosure of,
and adequate reparation for, any similar episodes of character assassination.16
7
Moreover, governmental forays against the SWP have not ceased.1
has only recently been settled although I was ordered retroactively reinstated for the
year 1971-1972 some time ago. I still have not been able to secure academic employment although I have solicited positions at over 150 colleges and universities and have
obtained the services of a national placement bureau." Id. at 139-43.
15. Record at 54, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8. For copies of
F.B.I. memorandum characterizing COINTELPRO activities aimed at Dr. Starsky see
id. at 56-69. See also id. at 54-55.
16. Poison-PenPolice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1975, at 36, col. 2.
17. In addition to the COINTELPRO program the special report of the Inter-
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In December, 1974, F.B.I. agents visited the landlord of two Socialist

Workers campaign supporters in Los Angeles and demanded to see
personal records such as a marriage license and income tax files.
Though attorneys for the SWP were successful in assuaging -the landlord's fears to some extent, he remained too frightened to oppose F.B.I.

demands that were neither compulsory nor proper.'
Instances of SWP harassment, intimidation and terrorizing are
legion. 9 But all assaults endured have not been government inspired.
Indeed, the most recent instance of harassment of SWP members, in

many respects the most terrifying of all, was apparently the product of
private individuals who resorted to guerilla tactics. On February 4,
1975, the SWP headquarters in east Los Angeles was bombed.

A

group calling itself the "National Socialist Liberation Front" claimed
responsibility for the assault. Under the familiar "White Power" slogan, it wrecked havoc and threatened annihilation for the SWP.

Fortunately no one was injured in the bombing nor in the ensuing
Nazi-inspired harassment of other SWP offices in the Los Angeles area,

but this reign of terror effectively curtailed SWP activities.

In her

affidavit Matilde Zimmerman, an employee of the Westside Socialist
Workers office, testified that she and her badly frightened co-workers

reluctantly took measures to counteract the Nazi menace.2"
agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) of June, 1970 (popularly known as the
Huston Plan, because it was prepared in the main by the Presidential liaison on internal
affairs, Tom Charles Huston) specifically included the Socialist Workers Party among
the groups and organizations with which it was concerned. The plan endeavored to enlarge so-called intelligence gathering operations. It called for, inter alia, the intensification of electronic surveillance of "individuals and groups in the United States who pose
a major threat to the internal security," the removal of restrictions on "legal mail
covers," surreptitious entry against "urgent security targets," and other measures both legal and illegal.
The committee consisted of J.Edgar Hoover, Director of the F.B.I., Richard Helms,
Director of the C.I.A. and Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, Director, National Security
Agency. Former President Nixon has acknowledged that he formally approved the plan
on July 23, 1970. It has been asserted that the plan was rescinded five days later at
the insistence of Mr. Hoover. However, substantial evidence, buttressed by the opinion
of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Ervin Committee)
and the recent release by the House Judiciary Committee on Impeachment, chaired by
Congressman Rodino, of much of the contents of the plan as part of the evidence used
to formulate the second article of impcachment, indicates that no rescission ever took
place. No formal memorandum of rescission was ever authored. It is known that at
least two recommendations including one calling for the establishment of a committee
to make operational the entire plan were in fact implemented. Sworn testimony by John
Dean before the Ervin Committee confirms this fact. See generally L. CHESTmR, C. McCRYSTAL, S. Aius & W. SHAWCROSS, WATERGATE, THE FULL INSIDE STORY (1973).

18. Record at 22, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8.
19. See generally Record, at 89-171, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8.
20. "On Tuesday, February 4, 1975, at 8:00 p.m., I attended a campaign planning
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Although devastating enough, the February bombing was not the
first experienced by the SWP. In 1970 the Socialist Workers state
meeting at the Central-East Los Angeles Socialist Workers office on Westlake Street in
Los Angeles. The purpose of this meeting, attended by candidates, campaign directors,
treasurers and others, was to plan out the activities of the Socialist Workers slate in the
upcoming Los Angeles municipal elections.
"At 8:30 p.m. we were told that there was a bomb outside the door. We quickly
proceeded down the back stairs. I was just outside the back door in the alley when the
bomb exploded with tremendous force, blowing out the windows facing the alley.
"I did not know, at first, if anyone had been hurt or the extent of the damage. Both
David Prince and Tom Scharret had been in the offices at the time the bomb went off.
The office where Tom Scharret was working was next to where the bomb went off.
It is a miracle that he survived. The desk where he had been was riddled with holes
from flying shrapnel. The windows behind the desk were totally demolished as well as
part of the wall. Luckily he ran into the adjacent office seconds before the bomb exploded.
"I remained in the vicinity of the building for the next six or seven hours. Most
of this time I was outside on the street. Many of the people who had been in the building were standing with me or close by. We could see all the destruction through the
windows and watched as the LAPD bomb squad carted out box after box of debris.
"It was cold and rainy outside and most people were extremely shaken up by the
blast. One person who started screaming when the bomb went off had to be taken home
to relax. It was arranged that people who were afraid to go alone or were too shaken
up to drive were given rides and people stayed with them.
'The next day I went to the Westside Socialist Workers office where I work. Sometime between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., when everyone was out of the offices, a threatening note signed "Venice Provo" of the National Socialist Liberation Front," was taped
to our door at 230 Broadway in Santa Monica. The note featured a picture of a drawn
pistol and a swastika, with the words:
"'POLITICAL TERROR. It's the only thing they understand.' I immediately
called the Santa Monica Police. Officer Armando Lopez came, and I explained what
had happened.
"On February 6, 1975, the Nazi Liberation Front claimed responsibility for the
bombing in a telephone call to City News Service. They claimed their goal was 'not
to harass the socialists but to exterminate them. WHITE POWER!'
"Later on the night of February 6th, there was a meeting of around 100 people to
discuss how the Socialist Workers Campaign was going to respond to the bombing. A
lot of discussion concerned the safety to supporters of the campaign and the rebuilding
of the campaign headquarters so that the campaign could begin to function again. Many
people expressed the feeling that the bombing had already had and would continue to
have a serious curtailing effect on the campaign and that we would have to organize
campaign activities in a new manner.
"Before this explosion occurred, people who were interested in the campaign were
free to come up to the headquarters and get literature and sit down and talk to campaign
supporters about the campaign. Now our headquarters are only open at certain hours
and the doors are kept locked. Campaign supporters have to function as guards asking
people who come to the headquarters what business they have, in fear of having someone
place another bomb. In addition, different meetings that normally would have taken
place in the headquarters had to be rescheduled at people's homes. The bombing has
definitely had a curtailing effect on our campaign and our ability to reach people by
having them come to our headquarters.
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campaign headquarters in Los Angeles was raided by twelve men who
terrorized the occupants and then set fire to the premises. 2 In 1969, a
publicly advertised fund raising party for the SWP at a private home was
invaded by three young men who drew pistols on the hosts and their

guest contributors and then set fire to the house.2" Nearly $5,000 in
damage resulted; additionally, the insurance company which insured the
home cancelled its policy, forcing the owners to pay substantially higher
premiums with another company. Because of constant threats to their
landlords and employers, accused of harboring "subversives," members

of the SWP are frequently forced -to find new living quarters and change
jobs. Even where the consequences of their political beliefs have not

been so dire, once they have been publicly identified, SWP supporters
have found their housing, work, or school situations made increasingly

unpleasant because of government or private censure.23

SWP offices

have received and continue to receive huge amounts of hate mail, crank
24
calls and bomb threats.

"On the night of the campaign meeting to discuss the response, Cathy Hinds received a call stating that there was a bomb scheduled to go off in 10 minutes. Everyone had to be evacuated from the building. Everyone went across the street and then
were told to go home in groups of people so that no one could be singled out for attack.
"I am extremely concerned about the security of our offices in Santa Monica and
Los Angeles. We have had to take expensive and time consuming measures to
strengthen the doors and windows of our campaign headquarters, just in order to continue to function there and proceed with the activity of gathering support for our candidates for elected office.
"I am also concerned about the effect that the recent bombings and threats will
have on the current Socialist Workers campaign for municipal office in Los Angeles.
From my experience on the statewide campaign in 1974, which included soliciting financial contributions, I know that many individuals who would otherwise have contributed
to our campaign, refused to do so when told that their addresses and places of employment would have to be disclosed." Record at 17-25, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines,
supra note 8.
21. Record at 124-34, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8; Record at 113-23, C-E Los
Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8.
22. Record at 138, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8; Record at 127, C-E Los Angeles
SWP v. Pines, supra note 8.
23. See generally Record at 100, 111-18, 135-71, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8;
Record at 17-34, 51-53, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8.
24. See generally Record at 59-101, 117, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8; Record at
17-24, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8. It should be noted that numerous
specific examples of harassment of the SWP on a national scale have been omitted from
this discussion in order to focus entirely upon California episodes for the sake of brevity.
But there have been nationwide incidents of F.B.I. harassment directed against the SWP
throughout the country. See Paton v. LaPrade, 382 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (D.N.J. 1974).
A subversive file was opened on a New Jersey high school student, Lori Paton, based
entirely upon her letter to the SWP written as part of a class project, and the file was
only destroyed upon issuance of a federal court order.
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Finally, past experience with the Waxman-Dymally Act has also
taught that compulsory disclosure requirements significantly impede and
often destroy efforts made on behalf of SWP candidates. Sympathizers
have privately told members of the SWP that they have refrained from
joining the party or have withheld financial assistance because of fear of
reprisals now that disclosure of their names is mandatory under law."
Supporters and contributors have explicitly requested assurances of
anonymity as a precondition of their aid.26 Those engaged in providing
services have on occasion refused to perform work for the SWP out of
fear of the aftermath once their identities became available to the public.
A number of these factors were analyzed by state chairperson
Matilde Zimmerman in the Central-EastLos Angeles Socialist Worker
Campaign Committee case. She described her experiences in attempting to coordinate a meaningful campaign effort for a frequently unpopulaw slate of candidates, and at the same time coping with the strictures of
the Waxman-Dymally Act:
From my experience on the statewide campaign in 1974, which included soliciting financial contributions, I know that many individuals who would otherwise have contributed to our campaign, refused to do so when told that their addresses and places of employment would have to be disclosed.
Under the WAXMAN-DYMALLY ACT, in effect in 1974, everyone who gave $100 or more, had to agree with their home addresses and places of business being made available not only to the
CIA, FBI and police, but also to groups like the "Nazi Liberation
Front." This was a tremendous obstacle to our raising the money
necessary to effectively air our political views through the ele.ctoral
process. During my travels around the state, virtually every candidate and campaign worker reported instances of potential supporters refusing to give money or otherwise participate actively in the
campaign because of the fear of reprisals against themselves, their
jobs or their families.
In some cases, even businesses such as printers were reluctant
to perform regular commercial services for us because of their fear
of being associated in any way with the campaign.
Under current law, reporting requirements are even stricter,
with disclosure required of all contributions of $50 or more. This
has a particularly damaging effect on campaigns such as ours, since
the great majority of our total resources comes from small contributions in the $50 and $100 range. In 1974, the Socialist Workers
Campaign received no contributions of $1000 or more, only two
of $500 and about 45 of $100. Our total budget was only around
$40,000. This compares to Brown and Floumoy who spent 3.5
million dollars on their campaigns.
25. Record at 111-14, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8.
26. Record at 89-96, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supranote 8.
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Our supporters and potential contributors are afraid that they
may suffer the same persecution others have suffered, often from
official governmental agencies, if their support for the Socialist
Workers Campaign is known. In San Francisco, a known paidinformer for the FBI approached a new campaign supporter and
attempted to get information 27about the financial contributors to the
Socialist Workers Campaign.
Ms. Zimmerman's last comment regarding the interest of the F.B.I. in
information about SWP contributions is especially ominous though consistent with recent revelations concerning F.B.I. activities with respect
to SWP sympathizers.
Similarly, Olga Rodriguez, a plaintiff in the Socialist Workers 1974
California campaign committee case as the gubernatorial candidate, and
an individual for whom a congressional committee maintained an extensive political activities file, 28 stated in the Central-East case that she
learned during the course of her campaigning that "[o]n innumerable
occasions people would decline to support or contribute to the Socialist
Workers Campaign [because] [t]hey would not want their name on
any. . . enemies list. . . . The Waxman-Dymally laws definitely has
the effect of stopping people from contributing to my campaign."2 9
In the same suit, plaintiff Catherine E. Hinds, certified candidate
for the board of trustees, drew upon her previous experience as a SWP
campaign worker and asserted that the Political Reform Act of 1974
seriously "hamper[ed] [her] ability to raise funds."3 0
The net result of these statutory requirements is to imperil the very
existence of the Socialist Workers campaign committees, and their candidates, as well as dissuade their supporters from venturing into the
political arena. Because of the controversial nature of their activities,
the past experience of the campaign organizations has been that compulsory disclosure of the full name and city, state, occupation and the name
of the employer or principal place of business of individual contributors
will cause present adherents to withdraw their allegiance and support,
and will effectively deter other persons from joining, lending financial
support, or otherwise providing aid to SWP campaign committees. The
SWP committees are already operating on meager budgets, while trying
to enlist as wide-based support as possible. The outcome of mandatory
disclosure coupled with simultaneous restraint on anonymous contributions will mean financial decimation and curtailment of the most funda27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 21-22.
Record at 103-10, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8.
Record at 26, C-E Los Angeles SWP v. Pines, supra note 8.
Id. at 42.
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mental constitutional rights to followers and prospective patrons of SWP
campaigns and candidates. No fair interpretation of the facts permits
any other conclusion. Indeed few cases in history have come before any
court with such an unchallenged record of repeated and continuous
instances of reprisals which have resulted from public knowledge of a
person's identity and support for a third party and its views.3 1
This history of official and unofficial harassment early indicates
that identified association with or support for the activities of the
Socialist Workers Party, including electoral activity, is always a controversial matter, and is usually extremely hazardous to employment, social
relationships and even personal safety.
Third Party Heritage-Anonymity for Survival
The importance to our democratic process of vigorous minority
32
parties has long been regarded as paramount. In Williams v. Rhodes,
Justice Black observed:
There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against
them. Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the
core of
our electoral process and of the First Amendment free33
doms.

The Williams Court's statement in respect to so-called third parties echoed the opinion of former Chief Justice Warren in Sweezy v.
34
New Hampshire:
Equally manifest as a fundamental principle of a democratic
society is political freedom of the individual. Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right
to engage in political expression and association. This right was
enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise
of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through
the medium of political associations. Any interference with the
freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot and should not be
channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has
amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident
groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and whose programs were ultimately accepted.
Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to
be condemned. The absence of such voices would be a symptom
of grave illness in our society. 35
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Cf. Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
Id. at 32. But see Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434 (1970).
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Id. at 250-51; cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
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The constitutional significance of third parties to our system of
government has also been analyzed by political scientists. Howard
Nash, Jr.,3 6 has pointed out that third party nominees have included
Presidents Martin Van Buren, Millard Fillmore and Theodore Roosevelt
and Governors Robert LaFollette and Henry Wallace. William Hesseltine has argued 37 that although:
[f]ew third parties have conducted national campaigns and a bare
half-dozen can truthfully be said to have influenced national elections . . . by voicing grievances and by proposing panaceas, third
parties have exerted significant influence upon the policies and
programs of major parties. In a curiously anomalous manner,
third38parties have bolstered the traditional American two party system.
The words of the former chief justice and the political scientists
are particularly apt when applied to the Socialist Workers Party and its
supporting campaign committees. As noted earlier, many of the SWP's
early proposals--equal rights for black Americans and women, diplomatic recognition of communist nations, and governmental assistance to
the aged and the poor-though once branded as radical and revolutionary, are now well-established aims of both major political parties. Even
today many features of the SWP program3 9 continue to find their way
into the mainstream of American politics. At the very minimum, the
SWP has fulfilled its historically crucial role of insuring that waters of
political thought have not stagnated, that new and creative ideas will
consistently be added to the political marketplace.
Such a legacy has not been without its heavy costs. It is an
unfortunate but undisputed fact of American life that the price of
espousing dissident views is far too often harassment and reprisals from
a majority fearful of change. As the record in this case attests, there
is no simple way to categorize the sources of this sort of conduct. Occasionally and terrifyingly, a government may structure an entire program of official action in an effort to mute the voices of a minority out
of harmony with the predominant sound. To achieve conformity, the
arsenal of the nation's highest domestic law enforcement agency has
been marshalled against the SWP members and supporters through the
F.B.I. COINTELPRO-Socialist Workers Party Disruption Program and
40
its progeny.
36. H. NASH, THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICAN PoLmcS (1959).
37.

W. HESELTINE, THIRD PARTY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).

38. Id. at 3.
39. See The Socialist Alternative for California, supra note 7.
40. The SWP filed a lawsuit to enjoin further F.B.I. harassment of their party, supporters and adherents. The case was however dismissed on procedural grounds. Social-
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Additionally, those responsible for acts of intimidation do not
always confine their energies to announced followers of the SWP. If the
goal is to silence the party and its campaign committees, candidates and
workers, then any persons who associate with the SWP are considered
potential prey. This includes those who would otherwise supply necessary services to promote candidates and policies of the SWP, as, for
example, the landlord of the SWP premises bombed this year.
It is therefore not surprising that minority parties have sought to air
their political views anonymously. Nor is safety sought in the form of
unsigned social criticism without substantial precedent. Over a decade
ago in the Yale Law Journalit was pointed out:
Anonymous writings have long played an important role in the
expression of ideas. Anonymous pamphlets have been used in
England since the beginning of printing. .

.

.

During the early

history of the United States prominent persons used anonymous
pamphlets and the unsigned letter . . . to express their views on
public issues. . . . At the time the first amendment was adopted,

the device of anonymous political authorship was well known, and
utilized by many of the founding fathers. The Federalist Papers
of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were published originally. . under the name of "Publius." The Letters of Pacificus by Alexander
Hamilton defending Washington's proclamation of neutrality ...
were published anonymously. Even Chief Justice Marshall, writing
anonymously as "a friend to the Republic," vigorously defended
certain Supreme Court decisions against attacks by Spencer Roane,
also writing anonymously. Between 1789 and 1809 no fewer than
six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and thirtyfour congressmen4 1published political writings either unsigned or
under pen names.

First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to
Associational Privacy and Anonymity
The Supreme Court of the United States, consistent with the best
ist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 375 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). SWP's lawsuit is not intended as a panacea for every political ill. The
gist of the SWP's complaint is that past and continued harassment and intimidation by
the F.B.I. as well as by other individuals and groups make forced disclosure incompatible
with First Amendment freedoms.
This lawsuit is confined of necessity to F.B.I. intimidation. The SWP urges that
the First Amendment will not permit its guarantees and protections to be deferred. It
is the government which must come forward and demonstrate that the SWP's grievances
are no longer well founded and that disclosure need not now be feared. Even if the
SWP's arguments were to be made totally baseless tomorrow, the First Amendment demands that they be at least afforded relief today.
41. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure
and the Devil, 70 YALE Li. 1084, 1084-85 (1961). See also Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64 (1960); 4 A. BEvERmGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 313-19 (1919).
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traditions of freedom of expression and belief, has taken care to guard
against state sanctioned attempts to infringe the fights of associational
privacy and anonymity of unpopular groups. In perhaps the seminal
case, NAACP v. Alabama,42 a unanimous court held that Alabama
could not compel the NAACP to reveal to the state attorney general's
office the names and addresses of its Alabama members and agents
without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the outset Justice Harlan emphasized the constitutional importance of group association:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly. . . . It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. 43
The Court next analyzed the harm which of necessity would be
endured when unpopular groups are constrained to make their membership lists public:
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce
upon the particular constitutional rights there involved. This Court
has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate
and privacy in one's associations. . . . Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs. . . . Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of
its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we
think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and
its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which
they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce
members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others
from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown
through
their associations and of the consequences of this exposure. 44
There can be no doubt that the compelled disclosure of the names,
addresses and business addresses of small contributors to the SWP
42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43. Id. at 460.
44. Id. at 462-63.
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campaign c6mmittees and candidates will often invite extremely serious
reprisals, ultimately crippling or destroying its electoral activities. The
legislative purpose of the campaign disclosure laws is to accentuate the
flow of information regarding who is contributing goods and services to
what candidates and parties. However, the effect of the statute is to
hand the opposition to dissident political groups an "enemies list" of
potential victims for acts of political and personal intimidation and
terror.
By the same reasoning, those linked in the public eye by virtue of
performing work for groups such as the SWP, though probably of
different political persuasion, will finally determine that it is wiser to
forfeit pecuniary gain than risk public scorn and harassment as the
result of such association. For a political party in obvious need of a
diverse set of services-printers, media and office suppliers-such a
state of affairs would be disastrous.
Finally, the NAACP Court declared that its holding was not dependent upon the particular character of the harassment experienced,
whether official or unofficial:
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have. . . follows not from state action but from
private community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay
of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial
exertion of state power represented
by the production order that
45
private action takes hold.
In Bates v. Little Rock,4 6 Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous
Court, rebuffed an attempt by the city of Little Rock to compel disclosure of the local membership list of the NAACP and the identities of its
financial contributors. After quoting extensively from NAACP v. Alabama, Justice Stewart directed attention to the fact "that compulsory
disclosure of the membership lists. . . would work a significant interference with the freedom of association .... "147
The Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the First
Amendment rights to associational privacy and anonymity in Talley v.
48 The Court there held a Los Angeles city ordinance to be
California.
void on its face because it forbade distribution, in any place under any
circumstances, of any handbill which did not have printed thereon the
name and address of the person who prepared, distributed or sponsored
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 463.
361 U.S. 516 (1960).
Id. at 523.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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it. Explaining the decisions in NAACP and Bates the Court once more
stressed that "[t]he reason for those holdings was that identification
and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public
matters of importance."49 What is at stake, of course, here is far
weightier than just "perfectly peaceful discussion," but rather the right
to participate peacefully and openly in a meaningful fashion in the
political process.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,50
underscored the constitutional barriers to be surmounted in an inquiry
as required in the instant case:
In the political realm, as in the academic, thought and action
are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.
It cannot require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two
major parties. . . . Until recently, no difference would have been
entertained in regard to inquiries about a voter's affiliations with
one of the various so-called third parties that have had their day,
or longer, in our political history. 51
In Louisiana v. NAACP,5 2 the Supreme Court unanimously declared unconstitutional a Louisiana statute compelling disclosure of
membership lists in certain nonprofit organizations. Reaffirming the
Court's adherence to Bates and NAACP v. Alabama, the decision
clearly held without qualification that where "disclosure of membership
lists results in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is
5 4 the Supreme
not required."5 3 Two years later in Gibson v. Florida
Court once again afforded plenary constitutional protection to political
and associational anonymity.
The Supreme Court's protection of the right of anonymity in
controversial political associations continued in Lamont v. Postmaster
General.5 5 In Lamont, the petitioner challenged a post office regulation
which compelled the addressee of "communist political propaganda" to
request specifically its delivery, thus publicly identifying himself as a
person desiring to receive such material. Declaring the regulation
unconstitutional, the Court noted:
[T]he addressee in order to receive his mail must request in writing that it be delivered. . . . This requirement is almost certain
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 65.
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Id. at 266.
366 U.S. 293 (1961).
Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
372 U.S. 539 (1963).
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects those who have
senstive positions. Their livelihood may be dependent on a security clearance. Public officials, like school teachers who have no
tenure, might think they would invite disaster if they read what the
Federal Government says contains the seeds of treason. Apart from
them, any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for
literature which federal officials have condemned as "communist
political propaganda." The regime of this Act is at war with the
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate and discussion that are
contemplated by the First Amendment. 6
Until recently on the attorney generars list of subversive organizations, the SWP has historically been stigmatized by both the government
and a number of citizens. But at the same time the Supreme Court
has continued to shield organizations or individuals similar in posture
to the SWP from like demands for disclosure. 57 It is important to recognize that the potential contributors to and suppliers of the SWP committees and its candidates are seldom public officials or even public figures. As a result they rarely have access to channels of effective communication and hence an available public form in which to counter
false or scurrilous propaganda. In short these individuals are more
vulnerable to injury and thus are in greater need of judicial protection. 58
Indeed as the Supreme Court made clear in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,5" public officials, by virtue of their decision to voluntarily
mount the public podium, must of necessity forfeit many of the protections normally afforded those in .the private sector. It is a fundamental
principle of our form of government that there be full and free discussion of the stewardship of public officials.60
But no such compelling need exists in regard to private citizens.
Though it may well be the very linchpin of the entire process, their
political activity is nevertheless qualitatively different from that of persons campaigning for election. In most instances they neither seek nor
desire the public spotlight. Private citizens wish only to foster their
political principles by joining and supporting others of similar persua56. Id. at 307. See also Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964),
afj'd 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
57. See, e.g., DeGregory v. New Hamp., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
('The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might
disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance."). Id.
at 143. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 645 (1970).
58. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
59. 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-45 (1974).
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sion. Unlike candidates or officials, therefore, they should not be required to sacrifice significant degrees of their privacy to accomplish that
end.
Further, it is beyond speculation that compelled disclosure of the
identities of campaign contributors and their employers, or of those
accepting campaign monies, will significantly discourage participation in
the political process. One political scientist has observed:
[t]he climate of politics in the United States exposes contributors
to harassment by the press and exploitation by the opposition.
Even persons with no need or intent to evade the law are led to
give under false names . . . [S]olicitors report that persons whom
they approach for contributions often say, in effect, "If you won't
get my name in the papers and have a lot of reporters calling me
up in the middle of the night, I will give you something." After
being interviewed by a federal investigator in 1956. the donor of
a legitimate, publicly reported campaign gift declared he would
give no more if doing so were going to provoke investigations ...
Those who advocate full disclosure argue that any gift unable
to stand the light of day should not be made. Or, at least, persons
making it should pay the penalty of public reaction. However this
may be, in addition to the rascals, there are citizens who feel that
contributing is like voting, a personal matter and nobody else's
business. 0:1
When the recipient of a prospective contribution is looked upon by
the general public as an outcast group representing an unpopular social
philosophy, and when it has been publicly acknowledged that the recipient has been targeted for reprisal activities at the highest levels of
government as well as by private individuals and groups, its political
support declines. Citizens who help finance third parties are particularly justified in feeling that their contributions or paid services are entirely
a personal matter, and their names and addresses as well as those of
their employers should not be a part of the public record. Those
desirous of participating within the political process should not be
compelled to undergo such risks.
The California Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme
Court, has steadfastly protected the rights to anonymity and associational privacy in every context in which a minority group might conceivably
suffer reprisal by virtue of the disclosure of the names and employers of
its members or supporters. In Huntley v. Public Utilities Commission, 2
a unanimous court annulled an administrative decision upholding a
61. A. HEARD, THE CosTs oF DEMOcRACY 360 (1960).
62. 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1968).
63. Id. at 73, 442 P.2d at 685, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
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requirement of the Public Utilities Commission that recorded message
subscribers include in the recording the name of the individual or
organization responsible for the message and the address at which the
service was rendered. The purpose of this requirement was to deter
frequent abusive or libelous messages aimed at certain individuals and
organizations which, it was charged, were encouraged by permissive
anonymity. The Huntley court balanced this interest against the interest in safeguarding minority views. It was particularly sensitive to the
delicate position a minority group occupies within the political process:
The majority may freely assert its beliefs and is secured freedom of speech by the very fact of its mathematical majority. It
is the minority, whether of the left or the right, which must overcome accepted views. To succeed, the minority must persuade
others until, as is the nature of a democratic society, it hopefully
attains the status of the majority. In doing so, the minority will
frequently be subjected to criticism and debate, a necessary adjunct
to the ascertainment of truth. But, depending upon the popularity
of the minority position and the inviolability of the majority beliefs,
the proponents of change may also be subjected to harassment,
threats and violence.
In this context, as correctly contended by petitioners, anonymity
may be an indispensable prerequisite to speech. When the content
of speech may lead to harassment or reprisal, fear or apprehension
may deter expression in the first instance. History is replete with
unpopular ideas which now form the foundation of modem society's mores and laws, but 6which
could only be asserted anony3
mously when first expressed.
Guided by the same principles the California Supreme Court in
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young64 struck down a state financial disclosure
law requiring that every public officer and each candidate for state or
local office file a statement as to the nature of his or her investments in
excess of $10,000, as well as those of his or her spouse and their
children, as a constitutional infringement upon the public officer's or
candidate's right of privacy. 5
It is true that on occasion the court has upheld the constitutionality
of certain disclosure laws. However, in each instance the court has been
exceedingly careful to be certain that its decision did not impair either
the rights of minority organizations or sweep more broadly than was
absolutely required.
Justice Peters, author of the Huntley opinion, turned back a constitutional challenge to a provision of the California Election Code making
64. 2 Cal. 3d 259; 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
65. See also Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1974).
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it a misdemeanor to write or distribute anonymously publications "designed to injure or defeat any candidate for nomination or election to
any public office by reflecting upon his personal character or political
'
Albeit a narrow decision; the law in question applied only to
action."66
attacks on candidates, not to writings which merely communicate opinions on issues, 67 and -there was no indication that any substantial inhibiStill, most significantly this case,
tion of expression would follow.6
Canon v. Justice Court, made explicit reference to the Bates and
NAACP cases:
In Bates it was found, "On this record it sufficiently appears
that compulsory disclosure. . . would work a significant interference ..... The same was true in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama .... There
is no showing that any circumstances exist in California which
would indicate a substantial likelihood of a significant inhibitory efvalid expression resulting from the disclosure requirefect upon
69
ment.

A 1973 act not wholly unlike that found constitutionally infirm in
Carmel-By-The-Sea 7 1 was upheld against attack in County of Nevada v.
MacMillen.7 ' In this case the legislation was carefully tailored to
conform to the guidelines set forth in Carmel. The California Supreme
Court began by saying that it was reserving analysis of specific problems
possibly arising from subsequent interpretation of particular provisions
of the act.1 2 Nevertheless, the legislation as a whole was not deemed
unconstitutional because it appeared:
to accomplish its legitimate aims in a less intrusive, and considerably more limited, fashion. . . . The act's "prohibition" provisions are keyed at enjoining only "substantial" conflicts of interest
;,. . and relate only to public agency action or decision having a
"material economic effect" . . . upon the official's economic interests. Thus, the act does not forbid an official to participate in agency
matters which could have only an insignificant, de minimis economic effect upon his interests. More -importantly, the act's "dis66. Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446; 393 P.2d 428; 39 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1964). Not every court which has considered similar statutes has so held. See, e.g.,
Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd as moot sub nom.
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 76 Misc.
2d 948, aff'd 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974).
67. Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 459, 393 P.2d 428, 436, 39 Cal. Rptr.
228, 236 (1964).
68. Id. at 453, 393 P.2d at 436, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
69. Id. at 455, 393 P.2d at 433, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (citations omitted). See
also Eisen v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 701-03, 75 Cal. Rptr.
45, 49 (1969); Huntley v. Public Utilities Comm., 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1968).
70. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 255 (1970), 85 Cal. Rptr. 1.
71. 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
72. Id. at 674, 522 P.2d at 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 351.

Winter 19761

SOCIALISTS WORKERS PARTY

closure" provisions are aimed at requiring disclosure only if the
official's interests could be "affected materially" by his public
service.... Moreover, unlike the 1969 act, the 1973 act does not
require disclosure of the actual extent of the official's assets and
interests, but only whether the value of his investment or real property interest exceeds $10,000. . . . Finally, the disclosure requirements of the 1973 act apply only to certain specified high-level
73
officials and not to every public official throughout the state.
The MacMillen and Carmel decisions are important because they
both concern public officials. The narrow abridgement of First
Amendment rights, permitted only after extensive balancing, did not
encroach upon the rights of private citizens. The requirement of some
public disclosure of potential conflicts of interest only were applied to
those already willingly committed to being publicly scrutinized. Individual citizens contributing relatively small sums of money to candidates
and parties to whose positions they subscribe, and, more dramatically,
individuals and businesses furnishing services to those candidates and
parties are both in qualitatively different classes.
Numerous cases, federal and state, echo this position. For example in American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings,74 Title I of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was alleged to infringe upon
the First Amendment. Entitled "Disclosure of Federal Campaign
Funds", Title III "establish[ed] an elaborate system of record keeping
and public disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures.
S. . ")76 Relying mainly upon United States v. Rumely, 77 the court
determined that the language of the sections in question did not apply to
the plaintiff organization, and thus avoided ruling on the constitutional
issue presented. Nevertheless, Judge Parker reaffirmed the policies in
NAACP and Bates, and expressed concern that controversial organizations would be "confronted with serious abridgements of constitutionally
protected endeavors" were the act to be applied to them. 8 Similar
sentiments were voiced in United States v. National Committee for
Impeachment" and Pichler v. Jennings."' No precedent established in
either state or federal court has required a political candidate belonging
to a splinter party such as the SWP to disclose information as compre73.
74.
75.
76.
1973).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 671-72, 522 P.2d at 1352, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973).
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 STAT. 3.
American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.D.C.
345
366
469
347

U.S. 41, 45 (1953).
F. Supp. at 1056.
F.2d 1135, 1140 (2d Cir. 1972).
F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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hensive as that required of the SWP under the 1974 Political Reform
Act.81

A three-judge panel consisting of Circuit Judge [now Justice]
Blackmun, and Judges Henley and Harris enjoined the enforcement of a
subpoena by a local district attorney of the bank account of the Arkansas Republican party as part of an investigation of election law violations
in Pollard v. Roberts."2 The effect of the inquiry would have been to
reveal individual contributions to the minority Republican party
throughout the state and to place the appellants in a predicament
resembling the one now faced by the SWP committees. The court
reasoned:
Apart from fear of actual reprisal, many people doubtless would
prefer not to have their political-party affiliations and their campaign contributions disclosed publicly or subjected to the possibility
of disclosure merely because an officer or agency clothed with investigatory powers may suspect that some members of their party
may have violated the law. Disclosure or threat of disclosure well
may tend to discourage both membership and contributions thus
producing financial and political injury to the party affected.
Whether we like it or not, political parties have to have money
and members, and anything which deters people from party support is detrimental to the party involved, regardless of what party
it is. And the potential detriment to be apprehended from an unjustified disclosure of member and contributor identities would appear to bear particularly heavily upon a party, like the Republican
Party in Arkansas, which for many years was and still is a minority
party as far as numbers of regular adherents are concerned, and
which in only recent years has been able to enter upon what appears
to be a period of rejuvenation and growth.
81. United States v. Finance Comm., 507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Stoner
v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974) are not inapposite.
In Stoner, the plaintiff contended that he should not be compelled to make disclosure because he was a "very controversial candidate." 379 F. Supp. at 710. Plainly
the degree to which a candidate is "controversial" is not the proper test. The appropriate standard centers on actual harassment, suffered in the past and likely to continue
as the result of compelled disclosure. Merely being "controversial" hardly satisfies this
standard.
Finance Committee supports the proposition that claims to nondisclosure cannot
be automatically foreclosed, but must be sensitively weighted pursuant to a traditional
First Amendment balancing analysis. Quoting from California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 56-57 (1974), the Court reaffirmed the holdings in NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) and its progeny and stressed the necessity of the court being presented with a concrete fact situation from which it could compare competing interests.
It is especially noteworthy that the Court did not state that the interests purportedly forwarded by the statute attacked constitutionally could survive all challenges in differing
factual contexts. 507 F.2d at 1200.
82. 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
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Along with the injury which unjustified disclosures of the type
here involved may inflict upon the affected party as a political organization, it is recognized that such disclosures injure individual
party members and contributors as well. For various reasons, including fear of reprisal or harassment, the possibility of disclosure
of their party affiliations and contributions, if any, tends to inhibit
citizens from exercising their right to participate meaningfully in
American political life.
...

To the extent that a public agency or officer unreasonably

inhibits or discourages the exercise by individuals of their right to
associate with others of the same political persuasion in the advocacy of principles and candidates of which and of whom they approve, and to support those principles and candidates with their
money if they choose to do so, that agency or officer violates private
rights protected by the First Amendment.83
In United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland,8 4 Senior Circuit
Judge Tuttle ruled that the First Amendment prohibited the House
Internal Security Committee from subpoenaing the bank records of
controversial political organizations in order to learn the identities of
financial contributors.
Recent decisions in the federal courts, 5 discussed above, dispel
whatever doubts may exist regarding the role of the First Amendment in
protecting nondisclosure. Each of these cases placed into controversy
the issue of whether the identities of contributors to a political committee or candidate could be publicly disclosed consonant with the guarantees of the Constitution. In none of the decisions was it even intimated
that under different factual circumstances, a First Amendment argument on behalf of the plaintiffs would not only have been proper but
would have prevailed, following precedent established in NAACP,
Bates and Talley.
Contribution to a political campaign, in an age where, candidly,
money talks, is a most significant medium of communication. Indeed
as the Pollard Court observed, it may be the only purposeful means
besides voting by which the average citizen can take part in the political
process. In an era in which frankly "money talks" financial gifts both
83. Id. at 258.
84. 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
85. United States v. Finance Comm., 507 F.2d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment,
469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974);
Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.
Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), alf'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
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make possible the ventilating of political views in the public marketplace and, more importantly, represent an unmistakable statement of
an individual's sentiments and beliefs. Like the placard and the handbill, a citizen's monetary contribution proclaims his or her personal position and marks an unmistakable effort to persuade or to alter the
views of others, consistent with the ultimate function of free speech.
A unanimous California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court"0
reiterated the concurring opinion of Justices Powell and Blackmun in
7
CaliforniaBankers Assn. v. Shultz:
In their full reach, the reports apparently authorized by the openended language of the Act [Bank Secrecy Act of 1970] touch upon
intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs. Financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations,
and beliefs. 88
Where the transactions here are the direct and intended articulation
of an individual's activities, associations and beliefs, the interests shielded by the First Amendment could scarcely be more at stake.
Other cases are in accord. In Shelton v. United States,89 a Klan
leader was cited for contempt of Congress for failure to produce certain
specified books, records, documents, correspondence and memoranda
relating to Klan organizations. Judge Fahy, writing for the court,
ruled that Shelton's failure to raise a more timely First Amendment
objection and his refusal to comply with even those portions of the
subpoenas not raising First Amendment issues, vitiated his defense.
However, Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Wright, in a special concurrence, held that had Shelton raised a timely First Amendment defense
before the committee, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bates v. Little
Rock, 90 NAACP v. Alabama,9 1 and Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP,92 would have precluded compulsory disclosure of Klan membership lists to the committee. Again, in Lieright v. Joint
Committee9" the district court indicated a deep concern for associational
privacy. A committee of the Tennessee legislature there sought to
investigate the "subversive" activities of a Tennessee civil rights organization. After reviewing the Supreme Court's actions in shielding the
86. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
87. 416U.S. 21 (1974).
88. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 246, 529 P.2d 590, 595, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 171 (1974).
89. 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
90. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
91. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
92. 366 U.S. -293 (1961).
93. 279 F.Supp.205 (M.D.Tenn. 1968).
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membership lists of controversial organizations from compulsory disclosure, Judge Miller ruled that the legislative committee could not compel
the disclosure of unpopular beliefs and associations. Accordingly, he
enjoined -the committee's investigation.
In January of 1974, the Supreme Court of New York county
dismissed a criminal indictment against several Republican members of
the New York state assembly charged with conspiracy to violate the New
York election laws. 94 Under the statute, 95 it was a misdemeanor to
distribute any form of political literature without revealing the names of
its sponsors. The Duryea court found the statute to be overbroad and
in violation of the First Amendment. Justice Roberts' opinion stressed
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in New York Times v. Sullivan90
of a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '97 If the
First Amendment is indeed "the darling of the Constitution's nursery"
and "the pursuit of its highest aims is an end in itself', 98 it will permit
the SWP campaign committees to retain their precious anonymity.
Should they be compelled to disclose their financial contributors, it is
likely that the state's storehouse of ideas will be diminished by at least
one strong dissenting voice and the criticism of other minority parties
will also be stilled.9 9
First Amendment MandateThe Least Restrictive Alternative
There can be no question that the state has an important interest in
safeguarding elections from the improper use of money to influence the
conduct of candidates, and to inform the public regarding the nature of
campaign support.'0 0 One need only glance at recent headlines to
determine the extent of public demands for campaign spending reform.
94. People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 76 Misc. 2d 948, affd 354 N.Y.S.2d 129

(1974).
95. N.Y. Elec. Law § 457 (McKinney 1967).
96. 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
97. People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 984, 76 Misc. 2d 948, 953 (1974).
98. Id. at 983, 76 Misc. 2d at 952.
99. See also Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Hentoff v.
Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970); Levinson v. Attorney General, 321 F. Supp.
984, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970);
Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd as moot sub nom. Golden
v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
100. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934); Brown v. Superior Court,
5 Cal. 3d 509, 487 P.2d 1224, 96 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1971).

HASTINGS CONSTITUI=ONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

Proponents of the Political Reform Act of 1974 contend that the
public's concern for election reform is vindicated by the provisions
proscribing anonymous contributions of more than $50 to any candidate
or committee and those prohibiting the secret donation of services to
such candidates or committees. The same claims have been made for
the Waxman-Dymally Act which amended the California Election Code
so that political gifts by a single contributor cannot exceed $100. Its
supporters assumed that as a result the electorate would be able to
participate meaningfully in the political process on a broad scale, armed
with the knowledge of who the individuals and organizations are that
exerted proportionate amount of influence on the campaigns of major
party candidates.
Yet at the same time, it is axiomatic that these statutes "must be
narrowly tailored to further the state's legitimate interest."''
As stated
in United States v. Robel:1°2
[Wihen legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute
which imposes a substantial burden on protected First Amendment
activities, Congress must achieve its goals by means which have a
"less drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment
freedoms. . . The Constitution and the basic position of First
3
Amendment rights in our democratic fabric demand nothing less.' 0
Neither the Political Reform Act of 1974 nor its predecessor, the
Waxman-Dymally Act, achieves its stated objective by resorting to the
"least restrictive alternative." As discussed previously, political organizations and candidates, especially controversial ones with a long history
of harassment, may depend for their very existence upon support,
financial and otherwise, from anonymous sources and from the guarantees they can provide to those performing services for them that their
involvement will not be publicly revealed. To this end, it is eminently
reasonable and indeed constitutionally commanded that any scheme of
political financial disclosure laws contain some sort of escape valve for
controversial third party candidates.
Possibly because of its Populist and later Progressive party heritage, Minnesota has adopted less restrictive financial disclosure laws so
that political candidates and their election committees are permitted the
"breathing space' that precious First Amendment freedoms need and
101. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972).
102. 389 U.S.258 (1967).
103. Id. at 268. See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 1118 (1966); United States
v.Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.
2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967).
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constitutionally demand to survive in an often hostile environment."0 4
Established by statute, the Minnesota Ethics Commission is empowered
to grant immunity of disclosure to individual associations, members and
contributors when it determines that revealing their sources of support
would result in economic or physical coercion. 10 5
Pursuant to this statute, in October of 1974 the commission exempted the Minnesota Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Committee
from reporting the name, address, occupation and principal place of
business of its contributors, lenders or endorsers. As a result legitimate
political dissent is permitted to flourish along with the vox populi of the
two major parties.
In the same vein, the state of Washington has enacted stringent
campaign financing regulations which require all campaign contributions over $5.00 to be fully disclosed even as to unpaid local officials. 10
Adopted in 1972, the legislative purpose if clear:
It is hereby declared by the sovereign people to be the public policy
of the State of Washington: . . .(4) That our representative form
of government is founded on a belief that those entrusted with the
offices of government have nothing to fear from full public disclosure of their financial and business holdings, provided those officials deal honestly and fairly with the people . . . . (10) That
the public's right to know of the financing of political campaigns
. . .and the financial affairs of elected officials and candidates far
07
outweighs any right that these matters remain secret and private.'
Nevertheless, the Washington laws also contain provisions empowering suspension or modification of any campaign finance reporting or
personal disclosure statement provision after a hearing, if it is found (1)
that literal application of the act works a manifestly unreasonable hard104. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
105. Ethics in Government Act § 8 MNN. STAT. § 10A.20 (1974) provides that:
Subd. 8. "The commission shall exempt any association or any of its members or
contributors from the provisions of this section [campaign reports] if disclosure would
expose any or all of them to economic reprisals, loss of employment or threat of physical
coercion.
An association may seek an exception for all of its members or contributors only
if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that a substantial number of its members
or contributors would suffer a restrictive effect on their freedom of association if members were required to seek exemptions individually."
Subd. 9. "The commission shall exempt any individual from the provisions of this
section who, by written request, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure would expose him to economic reprisals, loss of employment or threat of physical
coercion."
"The commission shall issue a written order to exempt the individual."
106. WASHINGTON REV. CODE § 42.17.060(2) (1972).
107. Id. § 42.17.010.
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ship, and also (2) that such08 suspension or modification will not frustrate the purpose of the act.1
The ultimate worth of provisions such as the Minnesota and Washington exemption clauses is that they eliminate from disclosure legislation its "selective deterrence" effect without impairing the basic policies
of the law. The problem was well identified in the Yale Law Journal:
A particularly pernicious aspect of disclosure legislation is its selective deterrence. On its face it may be impartial, aimed at all groups
and viewpoints. This apparent impartiality may, however, mask
actual discrimination against unpopular ideas. The major sources of
deterrence are social and economic pressure; these are most effective when they reflect, and are reinforced by, the majority sentiment
of the community. 10 9
The Minnesota and Washington laws give those proclaiming "unpopular ideas" their constitutionally required opportunity to demonstrate, by classic First Amendment balancing means, that the gains to be
won by disclosure would, in their particular situation, be outweighed by
the harms they would subsequently endure.
The need to establish some sort of balancing mechanism is perhaps
best revealed by SWP's struggle for existence in Los Angeles. Its
membership has experienced unparralleled harassment and intimidation,
despite the fact that it represents no threat to the integrity of the
electoral process. The opposing parties in the instant case have not
submitted a single declaration even intimating that the electorate has
expressed any interest whatsoever in the SWP's financial backers or
that failure to make this information public would compromise the integrity of the political process. Paradoxically, the main justification for
urging disclosure is based on the dubious premise that third parties may
field a slate of "puppet" candidates or "stalking horses" in conspiracy
with one major party to divert votes which rightfully belong to the other
major party. 10 Further examination, however, would reveal the hypothesis to be no more than a cinder in the theoretician's eye. The
SWP has yet to receive any secret donations from wealthy supporters
in return for the plums of patronage, nor does it expect that any are
forthcoming. The goals of the disclosure laws are scarcely advanced
by requiring compliance by the SWP."' There is further no sugges108. Id. at § 42.17.370(9).
109. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Frce Speech, Disclosure
and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1108 (1961).
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and denied in
part, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976).
111. Note, Developments-ElectionLaw, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1247 (1975).
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tion that the disclosure provisions of the 1974 Political Reform Act
were directed toward committees and candidates of minority parties.
As noted earlier, California law does not even presently permit the
names of many SWP candidates to appear on election ballots.
Moreover, SWP campaign committees are not naive regarding their
chances of defeating major party candidates. They do not pretend to
compete in terms of votes eventually to be won or campaign coffers to
be filled. For them, though their candidates are surely serious ones,
elections are vehicles to educate a public to new ideas and approaches.
This view of the political process is strongly endorsed by the American
historical experience.
As a consequence, those seeking to subvert the electoral system
would be wise to select other targets for their energies. The seeds of
political corruption and patronage are not sown by the SWP nor will the
public vote more intelligently upon learning of those who support or
2
furnish services to the SWP.1
Finally, in order to avoid the discrimination which the SWP has
suffered, disclosure laws paralleling the Minnesota and Washington
exemptions are needed. These statutes carefully balance the actual
need for disclosure of the identity of a particular committee or candidate
involved against the prohibitions of the First Amendment. Moreover,
the fifty dollar or one hundred dollar limit on anonymous contributions
and on campaign expenditures is too insubstantial to-correct the abuses
the laws were designed to alleviate. As one commentator has observed
with clear relevance to the issues:
Disclosure of all contributions would serve no useful purpose; in
fact, the surest way to impair the value to be achieved by the disclosure requirements would be to compel the collection of data so
massive as to baffle the investigator or newspaperman. But if the
disclosure were required only for amounts sufficiently large to give
rise to the possibility of the evils disclosure is intended to prevent,
comparatively few of the people who might fear retaliation would
be obliged to report. (How many university professors or union officials could contribute enough to hope to exert undue influence on
a President or even a Congressman?) Those wealthy enough to
112. See id. at 1247-51. Moreover, it is significant that the platform of the SWP
explicitly attacks the very sorts of interests against which the campaign disclosure laws
were intended to protect. Record at 172-75, SWP v. Brown, supra note 8.
113.

A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONsTrru-

50 (1972). See also Note, Recent Decisions, Constitutional LawFederal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Construed to Avoid Constitutional Question
Raised by Compulsory Disclosure Provisions, 23 EMORY L.J. 845, 860 (1974); Redish,
Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 900 (1971);
Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the
Devil, 70 YALE LJ. 1084 (1961).
TIONAL QUESTIONs
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make huge contributions would generally be immune from any
fear of retaliation. On the other hand, if contributions of $1, or
$10, or sums much larger but still well outside the range of possible harm, had to be disclosed, contributors might still feel insecure
against the possibility of disclosure, while there would be little public gain to balance off against the risks of deterrence. Perhaps different levels would be appropriate, depending on the office involved. In any event, a reasonably high floor on the amount of
which contributions would have to be reported would go far to
overcome constitutional objections. 113
This author submits that the fifty dollar and one hundred dollar
limits are not "reasonably high floors." Campaign abuses cannot be
avoided by naming all contributors of fifty dollars or more. The data
in respect to compaign spending are staggering to even the most fertile
imaginations. Total campaign spending in this country increased from
$200 million in 1964 to $300 million in 1968.111 In 1972 California
races for Congress and the State Legislature, $13,600,278 was expended,
an increase of 52 percent over 1970.115 Congress and Senate seats
cost $64,000 each; Assembly seats, $37,000. In the most recent election
for Los Angeles mayor, the two most popular candidates together spent
over $2.25 million dollars. Even a special election for a Los Angeles
City Council post cost the winner more than $67,000. A recent Los
Angeles Times article listed campaign spending figures for 1974 elections. Various lobbyists gave the following sums to gubernatorial candidates:
1. The California State Employees contributed $14,650 to Governor Brown and $7,500 each to Lieutenant Governor Dymally, Secretary of State Fong and unsuccessful controller candidate Bagley;
2. The California Medical Association's Political Action Committee gave unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate Flournoy over
$91,000, and Brown $15,000;
3. The Oak Tree Racing Association gave Brown $10,000;
4. Nelson Rockefeller gave Flournoy $5,000;
5. The United Auto Workers gave Brown $41,400;
6. Playboy magazine gave Brown $49,000;
7. The Western Growers Association gave Flournoy $51,269 and
$38,091 to unsuccessful Lt. Governor candidate Harmer;
8. Pacific Lighting Corporation gave Flournoy $10,000.116
Contributions in the neighborhood of fifty or one hundred dollars
scarcely compare to the above figures, and make ludicrous any claim
114. Hearings on H.R. 8627, H.R. 8628 Before the Subcomm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1971).
115. 4 CALIFORNA JouRNAL 60 (Feb. 1973).
116. L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
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that these contributors jeopardize the honest functioning of the political
system. For campaign organizations like the SWP which depend
almost exclusively on many small gifts and expenditures, the policies of
the disclosure laws are simply punitive.
From this perspective the purported interests served by the disclo-

sure laws must be scrutinized. It is hornbook law that in assessing the
state's asserted justifications for particular legislation, the justifications
must be measured against the actual parameters of ihe legislation it-

self.'1 7 It is not enough, for example, that a law be titled as a "Political
Reform Act" or that it contain a preamble indicating that its goal is to
acquaint voters with needed information. Pious generalities about good
government and a knowledgeable electorate will not suffice. The law,
as written, must in fact embody such goals.

Although a self-proclaimed legislative purpose cannot automatically be taken at face value, investigation of the intentions behind the two

laws challenged here is revealing because it establishes that the actual
legislation was not even responsive to the stated aims." 8
It is plainly evident that an explicit design of the Political Reform
Act of 1974 is to reduce the control over candidates and issues exerted
by the "wealthy" and the "large" contributor in an era of greatly
accelerating campaign costs, and to inspire greater overall citizen partic-

ipation in the electoral process."19
117. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
118. Cal. Gov't Code § 81001 (West Supp. 1975) establishes as the legislative intent:
§ 81001. "The people find and declare as follows:
(c) Costs of conducting election campaigns have increased greatly in recent years and candidates have been forced to finance their campaigns by seeking large contributions from lobbyists and organizations who thereby 'gain disproportionate influence over governmental decisions;
(f) The wealthy individuals and organizations which make large campaign
contributions frequently extend their influence by employing lobbyists and
spending large amounts to influence legislative and administrative actions;
(g) The influence of large campaign contributors in ballot measure elections is increased because the ballot pamphlet mailed to the voters by the state
is difficult to read and almost impossible for a layman to understand . . .

119. Governor Brown himself has observed that the present system of campaign financing "gives an unfair advantage to candidates with money and almost forces candidates to accept large contributions from special-interest groups and lobbyists." 4 CALIFORNIA JOURNAL 60 (Feb. 1973) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in a press release issued by the West Coast Office of Common Cause
on October 23, 1974, entitled "Common Cause Releases Study on Sources of Contributions to 1972 California Legislative Campaigns," and accompanying the 38-page report,
Michael Walsh was quoted as saying: "It is popularly assumed that legislative campaigns are financed by $10 and $15 contributions solicited from around the neighbor-
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The same end sought by the Political Reform Act of 1974 was
reflected in earlier campaign disclosure laws including Waxman-Dymally. The California Supreme Court recently outlined the conditions
culminating in the strengthening of disclosure laws affecting ballot
measures in 1923:
The report of the special committee contained a study of seven such
measures, and the committee concluded that in each instance
particular financial interests were able to exert sufficient influence
to be determinative. The "outstanding features" disclosed by the
committee's investigations were "[s]tartlingly large" campaign expenditures, and campaign "methods
20 and practices that constitute a
menace to our electoral system.'
Therefore, a compelling interest can only be indicated by statutes narrowly attendant to "startlingly large" contributions capable of
"exert[ing] sufficient influence."
In sum, the elaborate and systematic surveillance of one minority
segment of American political life mandated by the pertinent sections of
the California Government Code and the Waxman-Dymally Act goes
well beyond the legitimate governmental interest while at the same time
curtailing citizen participation in unpopular political causes.
Nor is there merit to the contention that third parties cannot be
exempted from disclosure because of the danger that they will then be
used as "fronts" or "stalking horses" by unscrupulous supporters of one
major party to subvert the other party's campaigns. This argument,
while hollow factually, possesses a certain element of irony because it
holds that minor parties must bear the ultimate burden of preventing
corruption in the major parties, even when it will culminate in their
own demise.
However, even if this were an acceptable state of affairs, the
monetary limitation is far too inconsequential to achieve the purported
objectives in a constitutionally satisfactory way. Although there has
been no indication that SWP campaign committees have ever been
hood. It's just not so. The Common Cause study shows that in the 1972 general election, the majority of all contributions reported by candidates from the state Legislature
were large contributions of more than $500. And sixty percent of these large contributions came from organized groups special interests, political parties, and slush funds controlled by incumbent legislators not from individual citizens."
Therefore both Governor Brown and the Chairman of California Common Cause
have identified the critical problem with respect to campaign financing as large contributions by organized groups. These same sentiments were expressed in § 81001 of
the Political Reform Act supra.
120. Brown v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 509, 521, 487 P.2d 1224, 1231, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 591 (1971) (emphasis added).
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manipulated for the purposes hypothesized above, or that the threat
in general is genuine, it is obvious that fifty or one hundred dollar contributions could not serve as ammunition for the destruction of rival
parties. It is true that SWP committees cannot and do not spend vast
sums of money; but if they did, money gifts would have to far exceed
the lower limit here in order to exert any significant influence on ongoing campaigns.
Blanket application of the fifty or one hundred dollar requirement
further offends the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Even assuming arguendo that for certain local elections the above figures might
bear a constitutionally significant relationship to the desired ends, it
cannot be genuinely contended that the relationship would equally
obtain for larger statewide campaigns such as the governorship. As in
Shelton v. Tucker, 2 ' where the Supreme Court held that an Arkansas
statute could not inquire into a teacher's protected relationships more
broadly than was absolutely necessary to determine his or her occupational competence, so here must the relevant bounds on campaign gifts
be appropriately scaled to the nature of the particular sort of election
involved. Such is the essence of overbreadth principles.
The constitutional infirmities are not rectified by holding that the
statutes do not require itemization of the precise amount of money
1 22
furnished by each named contributor or expended to each individual.
The gist of the SWP's claim is that mere public identification of the
names and employers of those linked with the committee will create
substantial hardship in the lives of their adherents and supporters, and
those performing services for them. Particularizing the degree of financial assistance provided or spent may conceivably exacerbate the extent
-to which certain individuals experience harassment and reprisals. But
the core problem will yet remain; government officials fearful of just the
existence of the SWP, anxious landlords, employers, friends, associates
and citizens dedicated to eradicating the influence of "subversives"
cannot be expected to draw fine distinctions-distinctions which are in
any case of doubtful constitutional vitality.
Conclusion
When a statute interferes with First Amendment freedoms of association, privacy and anonymity, the most rigorous standard of constitutional interpretation is applied. The statute must serve a compelling
121. 64 U.S. 479 (1960).
122. See Warden v. Brown, 185 Cal. App. 2d 626, 8 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1960).
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state interest, and it must do so by the means which are "least restrictive" of constitutional fights. The statutes here fail to use the least
restrictive means. The sections of the 1974 Political Reform Act and

the Waxman-Dymally Act respecting campaign disclosure, reaching
controversial organizations historically targets of intimidation, reprisals,
and terror tactics, and encompassing low-level political activity, violate
23
this precept..
In a brilliant and moving opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon describes
the dilemma faced -by third parties forced to reveal the names of their
contributors as follows:
123. The author believes that two recent "campaign disclosure" decisions strengthen
his arguments for the First Amendment right to the privacy of political beliefs and associations: Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part and denied
in part, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437); Doe v. Martin,
44 U.S.LW. 2243 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1975).
In Buckley, supra, the Supreme Court denied a constitutional challenge by the Conservative Party of New York, among others, that the disclosure provisions of the FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971, § 314 as amended 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1974) when
applied to minor-party and independent candidates was overbroad. The Court stated
that in view of the fact that the best the appellants could offer was the testimony of
several minor-party officials that a few persons refused to make contributions because
of the possibility of disclosure, that "the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm generally alleged." Id.
at 4148. Although it rejected a blanket exemption for third parties and their candidates,
the Court cautioned: "Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof
of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show
only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors'
names will subject them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either government officials or private parties." Id. at 4149. This author submits that the SWP has met the
burden of proof by documenting instances of "substantial harassment."
Moreover, with regard to the exposure of small contributors, Chief Justice Burger
observed: "To argue that a 1976 contribution of $10 or $100 entails a risk of corruption or its appearance is simply too extravagant to be maintained. No public right-toknow justifies the compelled disclosure of such contributions, at the risk of discouraging
them. There is, in short, no relation whatever between the means used and the legitimate goal of ventilating possible undue influence. Congress has used a shotgun to kill
wrens as well as hawks." Id. at 4199. (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
In Doe v. Martin, the SWP challenged the same disclosure provisions with salutory
results. The court held that because of a history of government harassment and government initiated private harassment of SWP campaign contributors their First Amendment
right to associational privacy had been chilled. Judge Leventhal was of the opinion that
the elimination of routine and automatic public disclosure of contributors to unpopular
minor parties that have been harassed would remove a measure that opens the door to
further harassment in a context where it is unlikely that what will be disclosed will bear
significantly on the election, and where the particular withholding of disclosure will not
undercut the overall objectives of election reform maintainable through the law's other
provisions.
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Associational privacy is of particular importance to minor
parties. Members of mainstream organizations such as the major
parties have little to -fear from being so identified. But to be publicly labled e.g., Socialist, Communist, or Nazi is to invite social
ostracism, loss of business or employment, verbal or physical abuse,
or worse. Fearing these consequences, many minor party adherents likely will be deterred from acting on their convictions. And
given the fragile nature of many minor parties, -the loss of even a
small portion of their support may well be fatal. 124
124. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.L, concurring and dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

